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I. INTRODUCTION
The Caribbean Basin Initiative is the first major effort by the
United States to employ an institutionalized application of devel-
opmental policy aimed at the economic revitalization of developing
nations in the Western Hemisphere.1 The concept was first pro-
posed by President Ronald Reagan in an address to the Organiza-
tion of American States on February 24, 1982.2 The plan envi-
sioned an "economic program that integrates trade, aid and
investment-a program that represents a long term commitment
1. Wolfgang Benedek, The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act: A New Type of
Preference in GATT? 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 29, 29 (1986).
2. Address of President Reagan Before the Permanent Council of the Organization of
American States, 18 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. DOC. 217 (Mar. 1, 1982) [hereinafter Reagan
Address].
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to the countries of the Caribbean and Central America."' The core
provision, duty-free treatment, sparked real excitement and hope.
Unfortunately, however, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (C.B.I.)
has fallen short of all expectations.
A major shortcoming of the C.B.I. has been the program's in-
ability to attract international investment to the region. Interna-
tional investment is a fundamental element in the modern equa-
tion for the economic revitalization of developing countries. The
Caribbean region fails to attract foreign investment because it fails
to offer a sense of security to the international investor. An inter-
American system of cooperative protection for intellectual prop-
erty would contribute to a sense of security, encourage investment,
and establish a sound foundation upon which to build a lasting
economic base.
II. OVERVIEW
The United States is currently pursuing the international pro-
tection of intellectual property through unilateral retaliatory trade
practices' and multilateral negotiations within the Generalized
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).5 However, these efforts
are not conducive to the successful achievement of the goal. Retali-
atory trade measures only exacerbate international animosity, and
the GATT is far too diverse an organization within which to reach
an effective consensus. The United States should consider more di-
rect and effective avenues, such as the C.B.I., by which to secure
international intellectual property rights.
The C.B.I. is a suitable mechanism because it is an interna-
tional program for economic development which is embodied in
the form of U.S. legislation, namely the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act of 1983.6 By its very nature, the C.B.I. affords the
United States a unilateral authority to dictate the terms of a
quasi-multilateral trade agreement. A simple amendment to the
C.B.I. legislation would automatically establish an inter-American
system of cooperative protection for intellectual property.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
5. Richard A. Morford, Intellectual Property Protection: A United States Priority; 19
GA J. INT'L & Comp. L. 336, 338-40 (1989).
6. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, ch. 15, §§ 211-216, 97 Stat. 369 (1983) (as
amended) (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706).
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This proposal envisions an amendment to the C.B.I. creating
an inter-American system of cooperative protection for intellectual
property based upon suggestions from the international private
sector. The centerpiece provision, modelled after the Hong Kong
Registration of Patents Ordinance,8 would establish the U.S. Pat-
ent and Trademark Office as the central figure in inter-American
substantive principles of intellectual property. The revised C.B.I.
would also include measures to secure effective national enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights' and the creation of an inter-
American, multilateral dispute resolution mechanism. 10 Only
through the C.B.I. can such an international framework be
realized.
III. TRUE INTENTIONS
An effort to amend the C.B.I. requires an honest analysis of
the U.S. interests which manifested themselves through the legisla-
tive process to yield the final product. The United States has os-
tensibly created a bold international initiative to remedy the eco-
nomic woes of the Caribbean Basin region, but the reality is that
the United States seeks to achieve definite policy objectives
through the C.B.I. Any proposed amendment which does not com-
port with those U.S. interests will probably fail.
The C.B.I. was not born of U.S. altruism. After all, the United
States only purports to act as the generous, paternalistic neighbor;
there are powerful U.S. interests at stake. Particularly, there are
two interests which merit explicit discussion: national security and
the assistance of U.S. private enterprise.1"
7. See infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
8. Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, in 2 LAWS OF HONG KONG 342
(1950).
9. See text preceding infra note 68.
10. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
11. President Reagan described the Caribbean region as a "vital strategic and commer-
cial artery for the United States." Reagan Address, supra note 2. See also Jean G. Zorn &
Harold Mayerson, The Caribbean Basin Initiative: A Windfall for the Private Sector, 14
LAW. AM. 523 (1983);
The Congress finds that-
1. A stable political and economic climate in the Caribbean region is necessary
for the development of the countries in that region and for the security and
economic interests of the United States;
2. the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act [see Short Title note set out
under this section] was enacted in 1983 to assist in the achievement of such a
climate by stimulating the development of the export potential of the region;
1991]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
The simple proximity of the Caribbean Basin to the United
States makes this complex region"2 relevant to national security.
Politically, the nations in this region represent an imperative se-
curity consideration regarding the United States' predominance in
the Western Hemisphere."3 This was a particularly sensitive area
for the Reagan Administration as it grappled with the region's po-
litical instability throughout the 1980s. Unemployment, inflation,
and staggering foreign debt all contributed to the human strife
which made this region politically volatile.1 4 The logical response
was an effort to cure the economic woes at the root of these
problems.
The C.B.I. also caters to U.S. private enterprise. Economically,
the Caribbean region represents a vast market for U.S. goods and a
fine investment opportunity for U.S. venturers. 5 Stronger econo-
mies in the region strengthen the market for U.S. goods. Interna-
tional investment, combined with intelligent manipulation of
C.B.I. provisions, promises the potential for high returns, as well.
The economic benefits to the United States also include the lucra-
tive transportation, middleman, and retail side of the duty-free
equation.
and
3. the commitment of the United States to the successful development of the
region, as evidenced by the enactment of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recov-
ery Act, should be reaffirmed, and further strengthened, by amending the Act to
improve its operation.
Pub. L. No. 101-382, 104 Stat. 655 (1990).
12. Each of the many nations involved has its own distinct characteristics, including
linguistics, culture, history, and political tendencies. Gema M. Pift6n & Raul J. Snchez,
CBI II: Will United States Protectionist Tendencies Yield to Economic Development in
the Caribbean Basin?, 20 U. MIMdI INTER-AM. L. Rav. 615, 619 (1989).
13. The United States seems to be expressing a tremendous interest in preserving polit-
ical influence in the region. One of the primary purposes of C.B.I. is "to ensure the economic
and military security of the United States by preserving its predominance in the Western
Hemisphere." Zorn & Mayerson, supra note 11, at 524.
14. House Report No. 266 states:
The Caribbean Basin countries have been seriously affected by the escalating
cost of imported oil and declining prices for their major exports (e.g., sugar, cof-
fee, bauxite). This has exacerbated their deep-rooted structural problems and
caused serious inflation, high unemployment, declining gross domestic product
growth, enormous balance-of-payment deficits, and a pressing liquidity crisis.
H.R. REP. No. 266, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 635, 644.
15. In 1983, United States export to the Caribbean Basin amounted to approximately
$6 billion. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
EcONOmIC REcovERY ACT ON U.S. INDUSTRES AND CONSUMERS, SECOND REPORT 1986 (1987);
see also Zorn & Mayerson, supra note 11, at 524. The C.B.I. seeks to facilitate this trade
through "assist[ing] private enterprise, particularly United States businesses, by making the
Caribbean region open to and safe for foreign and domestic private investment." Id.
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While it should come as no surprise that the C.B.I. is not
solely an exercise in humanitarianism, it is important to recognize
the U.S. interests at stake in order to identify and exploit the mu-
tually beneficial possibilities.
IV. OPERATIVE MEANS AND ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION
President Reagan envisioned that the C.B.I. would approach
its ends with four general provisions. First, beneficiary countries
would be granted unilateral duty-free treatment for goods exported
to the United States. Second, U.S. investors would benefit from
various tax credits. Third, the United States would increase the
amount of foreign aid to beneficiary countries. Finally, the pro-
gram would encourage and provide private sector training, techni-
cal assistance, and other necessary support for fledgling Caribbean
industry."6 Unfortunately, the only core measure17 of the bill that
survived to pass into law is the duty-free treatment.18
Duty-free treatment is a valuable asset for less-developed na-
tions. Recognizing this, Congress drafted the C.B.I. legislation to
impose certain requirements and considerations on eligibility for
beneficiary country status.19 The implication of these requirements
and considerations is very serious; they are powerful signals to de-
veloping nations as to what is a proper course. It is an opportunity
to steer developing nations in the direction of responsible growth,
which both respects foreign rights and provides a solid economic
base.
In order to receive the benefits of the C.B.I., a nation or terri-
tory must be designated a "beneficiary country." 0 Only those na-
tions and territories enumerated in the legislation may be desig-
nated,21 and only the President of the United States can bestow
16. President's Message to Congress on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 18 WEEKLY
Com. PRws. Doc. 323 (Mar. 22, 1982).
17. The peripheral provisions of the C.B.I. legislation are not relevant to this proposal.
Briefly, they deal with the eligibility of specific products for duty-free treatment, certain tax
treatments, and a ban on the importation of sugar from communist countries. See Pift6n &
SAnchez, supra note 12.
18. 19 U.S.C. § 2701.
19. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b) and (c).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 2702.
21. Only the following countries and territories, or successor political entities, are eligi-
ble: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and
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the status.22 The authority granted the President is limited by the
requirement that he notify Congress of the intended designation
and the various considerations involved in the decision to desig-
nate.2 Similarly, the President is empowered to revoke the desig-
nation of a beneficiary country in the same manner subject to the
same limitations, but with sixty days notice to Congress and the
beneficiary nation.24
The Act specifically prohibits the President from bestowing
beneficiary country status upon any candidate nation that falls
into certain categories. 25 Two of these categories affect intellectual
Tobago, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Christopher-Nevis, Turks
and Caicos Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b).
22. 19 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1)(A).
23. Id.
24. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2).
25. Section 2702(b) states:
In addition, the President shall not designate any country a beneficiary country
under this chapter-
1) if such country is a Communist country;
2) if such country
(A) has nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seized ownership or con-
trol of property owned by a United States citizen or by a corporation,
partnership, or association which is 50 per centum or more beneficially
owned by United States citizens,
(B) has taken steps to repudiate or nullify-
i) any existing contract or agreement with, or
ii) any patent trademark, or other intellectual property of, a United
States citizen or a corporation, partnership, or association which is
50 per centurn or more beneficially owned by United States citi-
zens, the effect of which is to nationalize, expropriate, or otherwise
seize ownership or control of property so owned, or
(C) has imposed or enforced taxes or other exactations, restrictive mainte-.
nance or operational conditions, or other measures with respect to prop-
erty so owned, the effect of which is to nationalize, expropriate, or other-
wise seize ownership or control of such property, unless the President
determines that-
i) prompt, adequate, and effective compensation has been or is be-
ing made to such citizen, corporation, partnership, or association,
ii) good-faith negotiations to provide prompt, adequate, and effec-
tive compensation under the applicable provisions of inter-
national law are in progress, or such country is otherwise taking
steps to discharge its obligations under international law with re-
spect to such citizen, corporation, partnership, or association, or
iii) a dispute involving such citizen, corporation, partnership, or as-
sociation, over compensation for such a seizure has been submitted
to arbitration under the provisions of the Conventions for the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes, or in another mutually agreed
upon forum, and promptly furnishes a copy of such determination
to the Senate and House of Representatives;




(A) has nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seized ownership
or control of property owned by a United States citizen or by a
corporation, partnership, or association which is 50 per centum
or more beneficially owned by United States citizens,
(B) has taken steps to repudiate or nullify
(i) any existing contract or agreement with, or
(ii) any patent, trademark, or other intellectual property
of, a United States citizen or a corporation, partnership, or
association which is 50 per centum or more beneficially
owned by United States citizens, the effect of which is to
nationalize, expropriate, or otherwise seize ownership or
control of property so owned, or
(C) has imposed or enforced taxes or other exactations, restric-
tive maintenance or operational conditions, or other measures
with respect to property so owned, the effect of which is to na-
tionalize, expropriate, or otherwise seize ownership or control of
such property, unless the President determines that-
(i) prompt, adequate, and effective compensation has been
or is being made to such citizen, corporation, partnership,
or association,
(ii) good-faith negotiations to provide prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation under the applicable provisions
of international law are in progress, or such country is oth-
erwise taking steps to discharge its obligations under inter-
ing arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens or a corporation, partner-
ship, or association which is 50 per centum or more beneficially owned by United
States citizens which have been made by arbitrators appointed for each case or
by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties involved have submitted their
dispute;
4) if such country affords preferential treatment to the products of a developed
country, other than the United States, which has, or is likely to have, a signifi-
cant adverse effect on United States commerce, unless the President has re-
ceived assurances satisfactory to him that such preferential treatment will be
eliminated or that action will be taken to assure that there will be no such signif-
icant adverse effect, and he reports those assurances to the Congress.
5) if a government-owned entity in such country engages in the broadcast of
copyrighted material, including films or television material, belonging to United
States copyright owners without their express consent;
6) unless such country is a signatory to a treaty, convention, protocol, or other
agreement regarding the extradition of the United States citizens; and
7) if such country has not or is not taking steps to afford internationally recog-
nized worker rights (as defined in section 2462(a)(4) of this title) to workers in
the country (including any designated zone in that country).
19 U.S.C. § 2702(b).
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national law with respect to such citizen, corporation, part-
nership, or association, or
(iii) a dispute involving such citizen, corporation, partner-
ship, or association, over compensation for such a seizure
has been submitted to arbitration under the provisions of
the Conventions for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, or in another mutually agreed upon forum, and
promptly furnishes a copy of such determination to the
Senate and House of Representatives;2 6 and
if a government-owned entity in such country engages in the
broadcast of copyrighted material, including films or television
material, belonging to United States copyright owners without
their express consent;
2 7
While it is encouraging that Congress recognizes international
intellectual property issues, the unfortunate truth is that these is-
sues are relegated to secondary importance. The only two require-
ments which concern intellectual property28 may be waived by the
President if he determines that designation is in the economic or
security interests of the United States. 29 This liberal waiver au-
thority, however, defeats the economic or security interests that
justify the waiver because intellectual property rights are a funda-
mental underpinning of those interests. The C.B.I. objectives are
jeopardized by the nominal commitment to intellectual property.
The Act also lists several factors which the President need
only consider in determining whether to grant beneficiary country
status.3 0 Two of those deal with intellectual property:
26. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2).
27. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5).
28. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2) and (b)(5).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2).
30. The Act outlines the following factors:
In determining whether to designate any country as a beneficiary country under
this chapter, the President shall take into account-
(1) an expression by such a country of its desire to be so designated;
(2) the economic conditions in such country, the living standards of its inhabi-
tants, and any other economic factors which he deems appropriate;
(3) the extent to which such country has assured the United States that it will
provide equitable and reasonable access to the markets and basic commodity
resources of such country;
(4) the degree to which such country follows the accepted rules of international
trade under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as well as applicable
trade agreements approved under § 2503(a) of this title;
(5) the degree to which such country uses export subsidies or imposes export
performance requirements or local content requirements which distort interna-
[Vol. 23:1
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[T]he extent to which such country provides under its laws
adequate and effective means for foreign nationals to secure, ex-
ercise, and enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property, in-
cluding patent, trademark, and copyright rights;"1 and
[T]he extent to which such country prohibits its nationals
from engaging in the broadcast of copyrighted materials, includ-
ing films or television material, belonging to United States copy-
right owners without their express consent;"
Here again, Congress recognizes intellectual property issues, but
relegates them to non-mandatory status.
In effect, requirements and considerations that apply to the
designation process represent the ideals to which the United States
hopes beneficiary countries will conform. It is really a kind of pri-
oritized "wish list," with the less important "wishes" occupying the
waivable or non-mandatory positions. Regrettably, by making in-
tellectual property issues waivable or non-mandatory, U.S. policy
de-emphasizes the fundamental economic benefits to all parties
which result from solid protection of intellectual property.
V. EFFECTIVENESS
The stated objective of the C.B.I. is the economic revitaliza-
tion of the Caribbean region. Therefore, an examination of success
or failure, for our limited purposes, should derive from a "before
and after" economic evaluation of the nations that have received
beneficiary country status.
tional trade;
(6) the degree to which the trade policies of such country as they relate to other
beneficiary countries are contributing to the revitalization of the region;
(7) the degree to which such country is undertaking self-help measures to pro-
mote its own economic development;
(8) whether or not such country has taken or is taking steps to afford to workers
in that country (including any designated zone in that country) internationally
recognized worker rights;
(9) the extent to which such country provides under its laws adequate and effec-
tive means for foreign nationals to secure, exercise, and enforce exclusive rights
in intellectual property, including patent, trademark, and copyright rights;
(10) the extent to which such country prohibits its nationals from engaging in
the broadcast of copyrighted materials, including films or television material, be-
longing to United States copyright owners without their express consent;
(11) the extent to which such country is prepared to cooperate with the United
States in the administration of the provisions of this chapter.
19 U.S.C. § 2702(c).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(9).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(10).
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An evaluation of this kind reveals that the C.B.I. has been of
little or no success, despite the eager participation of beneficiary
nations.3 s Since the C.B.I. was signed into law in 1983, beneficiary
countries have seen a steady decline in the total value of importa-
tion of their goods by the United States.3 " The United States, on
the other hand, has seen no change in the level of exports to bene-
ficiary countries.3s In relative terms, the very nations intended for
support have been steadily losing ground.36
Critics have blamed the poor performance on U.S. foreign pol-
icy objectives, 7 U.S. protectionist tendencies,' a lack of a central-
ized C.B.I. administration, 9 and the failure to capitalize on the
tourism and service industries.40 These are definite problems, but
the critics have overlooked the fundamental starting point for the
revitalization of developing economies in the modern world com-
munity: foreign investment.
The single most debilitating failure of the C.B.I. has been the
program's inability to offer security to the investor. After all, eco-
nomic revitalization cannot just occur out of nowhere; there must
be investment. In order to attract investment, there must be a
sense of security for the investor; and in today's international
economy, that sense of security must be suited to the international
investor.
The first step toward attracting foreign investment is to iden-
tify remediable deterrents. This proposal suggests that a vital con-
sideration for the international investor is the degree of protection
33. Pifi6n & Sinchez, supra note 12, at 623-624.
34. The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Commission reported a sharp foreign
trade reduction over the last decade, and an average 17.2% reduction in per capita gross
domestic product during the 1980s. Mexico, Central American Countries Plan Free Trade
Agreement to Be Reached by 1996, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 87 (Jan. 16, 1991);
U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC
RECOVERY ACT ON U.S. INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS, THIRD REPORT 1987, at ix (September
1988) [hereinafter THIRD REPORT).
35. THIRD REPORT, supra note 34.
36. Latin America and the Caribbean saw a 0.8% drop in real gross national product in
1990, and record loans for the year add to the staggering foreign debts. Latin American
Economies Register Decline of 0.8 Per Cent in 1990, IDB Report Shows, 8 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 15, at 554 (Apr. 10, 1991).
37. Pifl6n & Sinchez, supra note 12, at 627-28.
38. Francis W. Foote, The Caribbean Basin Initiative: Development, Implementation
and Application of the Rules of Origin and Related Aspects of Duty-Free Treatment, 19
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 245, 261-73 (1985).




for intellectual property. It is submitted that the Caribbean Basin
Initiative should be amended to reflect a solid commitment to this
vital aspect of the emerging global economy.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND
PROTECTION FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Protection for intellectual property is a fundamentally indis-
pensable aspect of economic health for developing nations which
seek to compete in the modern world market. Similarly, developed
countries rely on adequate protection afforded by individual na-
tions to maintain competitiveness. In the context of the C.B.I., re-
liable protection would have substantial economic benefits for both
the United States and the beneficiary countries.
From the perspective of the United States, there is tremen-
dous annual damage to the U.S. gross national product due to in-
adequate international protection for intellectual property. The
Federal Trade Commission estimates that the national losses for
1986 approached $61 billion.41 That astounding dollar figure repre-
sents roughly sixty per cent of the U.S. trade deficit.42 In the face
of such losses, U.S. industry is justifiably reluctant to invest in de-
veloping nations.4"
Beyond lost profits, inadequate protection may actually
threaten the very future of U.S. economic predominance. "There is
a direct link between the protection of intellectual property rights
and U.S. international competitiveness." 44 Financial losses yield an
apathy toward investment in research and development, because
the huge expenses related to that effort cannot be recouped suffi-
ciently to justify the investment.'8
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry, as the most frequently bru-
talized victim of international infringement, is a good example to
41. The losses included nearly 5,500 jobs in the chemical, computer, and software in-
dustries alone. Piracy of U.S. Intellectual Property, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 134
(Jan. 23, 1991). Estimates place the losses to the movie, music, book, and software industries
alone at $4.17 billion for 1990. International Intellectual Property Alliance Targets 22
Countries for 'Special 301' Lists, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 274 (Feb. 20, 1991).
42. Piracy of U.S. Intellectual Property, supra note 41, at 134.
43. Peter C. Richardson, The Need for Adequate and Effective Protection of Intellec-
tual Property: Perspective of the Private Sector, 19 GA. J. INr'L & Comp. L. 352 (1989).
44. Carol J. Bilzi, Towards an Intellectual Property Agreement in the GATT View
from the Private Sector, 19 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 343, 345 (1989).
45. Id.
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illustrate the foregoing. In order to bring a new pharmaceutical
product onto the market, it takes an estimated ten years and $125
million from the time of discovery in the laboratory.46 This figure
does not even take into account the millions of dollars poured into
unsuccessful projects.4 7 After a firm underwrites the cost of devel-
oping a product, infringers have a windfall by undercutting the
price of the original. This infringement prevents the legitimate
producer from recouping the investment, resulting in the virtual
rape of the very individual or firm which releases the benefit to
society.
The legitimate producer is usually powerless to protect against
this literal robbery. Except in very limited circumstances, the U.S.
intellectual property laws do not carry extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion.4 8 Intellectual property treaties4e focus primarily on priority in
the initial application process,50 and have little or no effect on the
46. See Richardson, supra note 43, at 356; see also infra text accompanying note 57.
47. Id.
48. In patent litigation, extraterritorial jurisdiction may attach where the defendant has
a sufficient number of contacts with the state in which the District Court sits. Honeywell,
Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 184 U.S.P.Q. 387 (7th Cir. 1975). There also
appears to be a trend toward considering the aggregate of contacts with the United States as
a whole. Antonius v. Kamata-Ri Co., 204 U.S.P.Q. 111 (D.Md. 1979); Cryomedics, Inc. v.
Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 188 U.S.P.Q. 255 (D.Conn. 1975).
Following the same guidelines, U.S. trademark legislation grants broader extraterritorial
jurisdiction, but even the most lenient cases have included facts such as U.S. citizenship of
the defendant, contracts with U.S. firms for the purchase of parts to make the product
which bears the infringing mark, and smuggling of those products into the United States.
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 73 S.Ct. 252, 97 L.Ed 319 (1952).
U.S. copyright laws do not grant liberal extraterritorial jurisdiction. Filmvideo Releas-
ing Corp. v. Hastings, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981).
There have been instances where U.S. courts have adjudicated patent claims based
upon violation of foreign laws committed in foreign jurisdictions. Ortman v. Stanray Corp.,
163 U.S.P.Q. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1969). However, this transitory cause of action theory appears to
be rare in patent and trademark cases. Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments,
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. I1. 1972) (patent matter); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co.,
234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956) (trademark matter). Copyright claims appear more susceptible
to the theory. London Film Productions Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580
F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
49. See, e.g., Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S.
3324; Berne Convention, July 24, 1971 reprinted in MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY.
RIGHT, app. 27 (1991); Convention of the Union of Paris, July 14, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1583; 24
U.S.T. 2140; T.I.A.S. 6923, 7727; Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645,
T.I.A.S. 8733; General Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protec-
tion, Apr. 2, 1930, 40 Stat. 2907, 124 L.N.T.S. 357.
50. See generally Gabriel M. Frayne, History and Analysis of TRT, 63 TRADEMARK
REP. 422 (1973); Benson, The Impact of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and the
European Patent Convention (EPC) on U.S. Practitioners, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 118 (1978).
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infringer." Ultimately, the legitimate producer can only look to the
generally fruitless proceedings under the particular nation's laws 2
The abuses are routinely ignored by the national governments
because developing countries generally do not appreciate the long-
term benefits of intellectual property protection. Instead, these na-
tions tolerate piracy to gain the immediate reward of lower prices
resulting from rampant infringement.
5 3
The reality is that developing countries do themselves a terri-
ble disservice by failing to adequately protect intellectual prop-
erty.54 The short-term gains of infringement and piracy are far out-
weighed by the long-term benefits of adequate protection, such as
stimulation of innovation, attraction of investment and technology,
and maintenance of favorable trade relations.
Domestically, protecting intellectual property is the first step
for developing countries in cultivating an environment in which
native individuals and firms can blossom into internationally com-
petitive industries. 55 This is accomplished primarily by inspiring
innovation, because unbridled infringement discourages persons
and firms from revealing their valuable secrets or creative fruits.
Developing nations should protect their innovative element in or-
der to encourage the sharing of originality and creativity. This re-
leases the beneficial ideas so that all can reap the gains, while al-
lowing others to legally improve on the ideas for further benefits.
Moreover, that protection deters "brain drain," a phenomenon ex-
perienced by many underdeveloped nations whereby their most
51. Conventions simply do not guarantee adequacy of protection. Even in those coun-
tries which have acceptable laws, the remedy is difficult to attain or insufficient to justify
the effort. Richard V. Campagna, Video and Satellite Transmission Piracy in Latin
America: A Survey of Problems, Legal Strategies and Remedies, 20 INT'L LAW. 961, 965
(1989); see also Bilzi, supra note 44, at 346. Conventions "have not been effective in stop-
ping the tremendous losses suffered by industries due to counterfeiting and piracy ...
Often, parties are only required to provide national treatment, which translates into no pro-
tection for foreigners when a country's domestic laws do not [even] adequately protect local
owners of intellectual property rights." Id.
52. Campagna, supra note 51, at 965.
53. Returning to the pharmaceuticals example, the shortsighted rationale is that the
need for inexpensive medicine outweighs the interests of U.S. corporate profit maximization.
Richardson, supra note 43, at 356.
54. Carla Hills, the U.S. Trade Representative, commented, "Thailand's stake in im-
proving protection is considerable, both in terms of attracting foreign investment and ensur-
ing that its own artists and entrepreneurs received fair compensation for their efforts." U.S.
Launches Investigation of Thailand's Weak Enforcement of Copyright Legislation, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 4 (Jan. 2, 1991).
55. Bilzi, supra note 44, at 346.
1991]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
productive minds migrate to other nations which offer an environ-
ment more supportive and protective of their efforts .5
Protecting intellectual property further serves the developing
nation by removing a major deterrent to international investment:
fear of theft. "Without such protection, U.S. companies are reluc-
tant to invest in developing countries and to transfer technology to
those countries, for fear it will be lost or taken by others." If that
major deterrent can be eliminated, then investment and technol-
ogy should begin to flow into these nations.58
On the international stage, intellectual property disputes are a
major cause of unilateral trade retaliation measures.5 9 In fact, most
U.S. trade legislation provides for measures to identify and combat
such problems abroad. 0 Developing countries are particularly in-
jured by the proliferation of such solutions because these weaker
nations depend on the multilateral system to preserve favorable
trade circumstances. 1
VII. SUGGESTIONS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The private sector has been the driving force for higher inter-
national standards of intellectual property protection. In 1986, a
coalition of twelve major U.S. corporations joined forces to form
the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC).2 This organization
seeks to develop a comprehensive program for the international
protection of intellectual property to be integrated into the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." The IPC Program, though
56. Id.
57. Richardson, supra note 43, at 356.
58. Id.
59. In response to Thailand's failure to provide adequate protection for intellectual
property, the United States denied preferential tariff treatment under the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences. Bilzi, supra note 44, at 346. As another example, Brazil's unwillingness
to pass acceptable patent protection laws prompted the U.S. Trade Representative to im-
pose over $40 million in sanctions under § 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. Hills Lifts $40 Million
in Sanctions After Brazil Pledges to Enact Patent Law, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27,
at 997 (July 4, 1990); Trade Act of 1974, ch. 12, § 301, 88 Stat. 2041 (1974) (as amended)
(current version at 19 U.S.C. § 2411).
60. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411; Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 4, § 337, 102 Stat. 1211
(1930) (as amended) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1337). See Bilzi, supra note 44, at 346.
61. Bilzi, supra note 44, at 347.
62. "The members of the IPC are Bristol-Meyers, DuPont, FMC Corporation, General
Electric, Hewlett-Packard, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, Pfizer, Rockwell Interna-
tional, and Warner Communications." Id. at 343-44.
63. Id. at 344-45.
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prepared with a focus on the GATT, offers an excellent framework
which can be adapted to any international initiative on intellectual
property.
The IPC collaborated with the European and Japanese private
sectors, 4 also severely injured by inadequate international protec-
tion for intellectual property." Working together, the three busi-
ness groups developed a comprehensive trilateral report and pro-
posal (Trilateral Proposal) which is widely endorsed by intellectual
property associations.6
The Trilateral Proposal, entitled "Basic Framework of GATT
provisions on Intellectual Property," calls for a three-pronged
framework. The essential elements of adequate international pro-
tection for intellectual property are: (1) strong enforcement mecha-
nisms; (2) fundamental substantive principles of intellectual prop-
erty protection; and (3) multilateral consultation and dispute
settlement procedures. 7 Only a combination of the three measures
can yield a satisfactory result.
First, strict enforcement is absolutely necessary. The Trilat-
eral Proposal suggests a double-edged approach to enforcement:
(a) customs and border patrols under domestic trade law, and (b)
remedies under domestic intellectual property laws.68 The first
measure is designed to combat the importation of infringing goods
before they enter the stream of commerce. The second measure
seeks to combat the domestic infringer. A participating party
would be required to provide acceptable procedures and remedies
to satisfy both of the enforcement requirements.
Second, there must be minimum standards of protection,
known as fundamental substantive principles of intellectual prop-
erty. These substantive principles act as the reference point for
the systems of participating nations. This requires minimum stan-
dards concerning the fundamental principles of patent, trademark,
and copyright law.70 Such a measure imposes qualifications on the
64. The Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe and the Japan
Federation of Economic Organizations. The United States, the European Community, and
Japan have taken the leading roles in the negotiations concerning intellectual property in
GATT. Id. at 343-45.
65. Id. at 344.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 347.
68. Id. at 347-48.
69. Id. at 348.
70. Id. at 348-49.
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registration process, the infringement laws, and the dispute resolu-
tion process.
Lastly, the Trilateral Proposal calls for the implementation of
a multilateral dispute resolution mechanism. In the event that an
owner of an intellectual property right cannot obtain effective re-
dress within the legal framework of an individual nation, that
owner's government could invoke the mechanism and force resolu-
tion before a multilateral tribunal.71
The private sector has identified and promoted these basic
guidelines which are essential to the adequacy of an international
agreement on protection for intellectual property. Unfortunately,
efforts are focused on the GATT, 2 which represents the largest
agreement on international trade. A workable consensus cannot
emerge from this forum because there are too many members with
too many diverse interests.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative, on the other hand, represents
an excellent opportunity to present this promising set of ideas to
the international community. Because the United States is the
central figure and because it is U.S. legislation which governs the
initiative, a simple amendment to the C.B.I. would automatically
thrust this new agenda onto the international stage.
Adoption of and adherence to an inter-American system of co-
operative protection for intellectual property could be included
among the non-waivable requirements to receive or maintain C.B.I.
designation. Compliance would not require radical change on the
part of beneficiary countries, and in light of their already gloomy
economic predicaments." Most should opt for a responsible course
toward economic advancement.
VIII. PROPOSAL
Beneficiary nations might be initially hesitant to participate in
an inter-American system of cooperative protection for intellectual
property. This reluctance will probably be overcome by the desire
to maintain beneficiary country status, but there should be addi-
tional enticements to encourage full participation. Thus, the imple-
mentation of the principles delineated in the Trilateral Proposal
71. Id. at 349.
72. See Bilzi, supra note 44, at 344-45; see also text accompanying supra note 63.
73. Text accompanying supra notes 33-36.
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should be easily accomplishable with both immediate and long-
term benefits to beneficiary countries. Perhaps these developing
nations would finally accept an internationally sound system for
the protection of intellectual property.
The proposal calls for incorporation of the three-pronged
framework from the Trilateral Proposal. Any country wishing to
receive or retain C.B.I. designation would have to comply with gen-
eral guidelines based on the Trilateral Proposal.
Mirroring the first prong, beneficiary countries would have to
provide for strict enforcement." This could be easily accomplished
since beneficiary countries already maintain customs and border
patrols. The need for remedies under domestic intellectual prop-
erty laws, if none exist, can be met by simply writing and enforcing
the laws.
Skipping to the third prong, the revised C.B.I. would call for
multilateral consultations and dispute settlement procedures.75
Tailored to the C.B.I. context, and provided for in the actual legis-
lation, a network of multilateral councils and tribunals would be
organized, representative of the nations, to give the ultimate
"teeth" to the system. Decisions of the domestic courts could be
appealed to these bodies. This institution might also serve to pro-
vide the C.B.I. with the centrality it now lacks, and perhaps be-
come a guiding force in the spirit of the European Court of Justice.
The difficulty with the Trilateral Proposal's framework is in
reaching agreement on the second prong; there are many divergent
notions about fundamental substantive principles of intellectual
property. 76 Resolution of this discord requires substantial influ-
ence, and fortunately, the C.B.I. affords the United States the nec-
essary clout to set the terms of this unique legislation/international
agreement.
Beneficiary countries would have the opportunity to choose
between two options. First, each beneficiary country could opt to
incur the hardship and expense of establishing and maintaining a
satisfactory patent, trademark, and copyright office in compliance
with the Trilateral Proposal guidelines concerning substantive
principles of intellectual property.
74. Bilzi, supra note 44, at 347-48.
75. Id. at 349; see also text accompanying supra note 71.
76. Supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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In the alternative, a beneficiary country could opt to produce
legislation which would mandate the grant of a domestic certificate
of registration to any owner of a U.S. certificate of registration for
a patent, trademark, or copyright from the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (U.S.P.T.O.). Anyone seeking protection on
an inter-American scale would simply apply for and obtain regis-
tration of the matter in the U.S.P.T.O. Upon presentation of the
U.S. certificate, the beneficiary country would issue a domestic cer-
tificate, which would grant all rights and privileges in the protected
matter, including the right to redress in the courts of that nation.
This latter option benefits all parties involved."
The proposal to link beneficiary countries to the U.S.P.T.O. is
based on the Hong Kong model. According to the Hong Kong Re-
77. The suggestions in this proposal are in line with the general theme of the principal
U.S. objectives concerning intellectual property negotiations in the GATT, as expressed by
Congress:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.- The principal negotiating objectives of the
United States regarding intellectual property are-
(A) to seek the enactment and effective enforcement by foreign countries of laws
which-
(i) recognize and adequately protect intellectual property, including copy-
rights, patents, trademark, semi-conductor chip layouts designs, and trade
secrets, and
(ii) provide protection against unfair competition,
(B) to establish in the GATT obligations-
(i) to implement adequate substantive standards based on-
(I) the standards in existing international agreements that provide
adequate protection, and
(II) the standards in national laws if international agreement stan-
dards are inadequate or do not exist,
(ii) to establish effective procedures to enforce, both internally and at the
border, the standards implemented under clause (i), and
(iii) to implement effective dispute settlement procedures that improve on
existing GATT procedures;
(C) to recognize that the inclusion in the GATT of-
(i) adequate and effective substantive norms and standards for the protec-
tion and enforcement of intellectual property rights, and dispute settle-
ment provisions and enforcement procedures, is without prejudice to
other complementary initiatives undertaken in other international organi-
zations; and
(D) to supplement and strengthen standards for protection and enforcement in
existing international intellectual property conventions administered by other
international organizations, including their expansion to cover new and emerging
technologies and elimination of discrimination or preconditions to protection.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1123-
1124 (1988).
Clause (B)(i)(II) is directly on point; the here-proposed inter-American system of coop-
erative protection for intellectual property incorporates fundamental substantive principles
of intellectual property in the "national laws" of the United States. Id.
CARIBBEAN BASIN
gistration of Patents Ordinance,7 8 any owner of a certificate of pat-
ent granted by the British Patent Bureau has the right to apply for
and obtain a Hong Kong certificate of patent. The Hong Kong cer-
tificate of patent endows all domestic rights and privileges in the
protected matter, including the right to rely on that certificate in
the courts.
Moreover, in opting to produce legislation which grants do-
mestic registrations in this way, these nations relieve themselves of
the expense in maintaining an intellectual property institution.
Were a nation to opt for maintaining its own system in compliance
with the standards outlined in the Trilateral Proposal, it would
have to maintain an office similar to the U.S.P.T.O.79 Linking ben-
eficiary countries to the U.S.P.T.O. eliminates these expenses, ex-
cept for a skeleton administrative body. Most importantly, benefi-
ciary countries could collect substantial revenues,80 without
incurring the overhead, by levying lucrative issue fees for the do-
mestic certificates of registration.
In addition to the beneficiary countries, the United States and
the international community would benefit, as well. This uniform
application of fundamental substantive principles of intellectual
property, according to U.S. standards, would be of tremendous
value to the entire international private sector.81 Provided that the
enforcement measures were effective, international business would
see an end to the billions and billions of dollars lost to infringe-
ment and piracy.
78. Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, supra note 8, at § 3.
Any person being the grantee of a patent in the United Kingdom, or any person
deriving his right from such grantee by assignment, transmission or other opera-
tion of law, may, within five years from the date of issue of the patent, apply to
have such patent registered in Hong Kong. Where any partial assignment or
transmission has been made all proper parties shall be joined in the application
for registration.
Id.
79. Such an office requires an educated and experienced staff of examiners, a complete
library of the prior art, and a massive administrative corps.
80. In 1990, nearly 20,000 international patent applications were filed under the Patent
Cooperation Treaty, supra note 49. This number does not include the much larger number
of applications filed independently in individual nations. The World Intellectual Property
Organization, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 256 (Feb. 13, 1991).




The Caribbean Basin Initiative is an international program
with great vision. Unfortunately, it has failed to deliver results
commensurate with its potential. A remediable defect in the C.B.I.
is its inability to promote substantial investment in the region. In-
vestment would be attracted were there to be implemented an in-
ter-American system for the cooperative protection of intellectual
property.
Amending the C.B.I. so as to adopt the principles of the Tri-
lateral Proposal and follow the Hong Kong model on an inter-
American scale would provide a practical remedy to the C.B.I.'s
failure to attract international investment to the region. Such a so-
lution would be beneficial to all involved, and perhaps set the
agenda for a worldwide agreement on the protection of intellectual
property.
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